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Abstract—We study a new application of threshold-based
secret sharing in a distributed online social network (DOSN),
where users need a means to back up and recover their
private keys in a network of untrusted servers. Using a simple
threshold-based secret sharing in such an environment is
insufficiently secured since delegates keeping the secret shares
may collude to steal the user’s private keys. Adversary can
then take control of users’ machines, infect them with malicious
software, and use them for further attacks. This can lead to
an epidemic that makes the whole system eventually collapse.
To mitigate this problem, we propose using different tech-
niques to improve the system security: by selecting only the
most reliable delegates for keeping these shares and further by
encrypting the shares with passwords. We develop a mechanism
to select the most reliable delegates based on an effective trust
measure. Specifically, relationships among the secret owner,
delegate candidates and their related friends are used to
estimate the trustworthiness of a delegate. This trust measure
minimizes the likelihood of the secret being stolen by an
adversary and is shown to be effective against various collusive
attacks. Extensive simulations show that the proposed trust-
based delegate selection performs very well in highly vulnerable
environments where the adversary controls many nodes with
different distributions and even with spreading of infections in
the network. In fact, the number of keys lost is very low under
extremely pessimistic assumptions of the adversary model.
Keywords-secret sharing; online social networks; distributed
online social networks; trust;
I. INTRODUCTION
A threshold-based secret sharing scheme is a multi-party
cryptographical protocol to enable a user to share her secret
with only intended recipients in a distributed system [13].
A traditional (k, n)-threshold secret sharing protocol splits a
secret into n parts (shares) any k of which (minimum) suf-
fices to reconstruct the secret, e.g., the Shamir approach [14].
This approach can be well adapted to meet the nuances
of peer-to-peer environment, and online social networking
applications, where a user can not totally trust any other
user, and no other single user is told the whole secret.
In this paper, we propose a new application of threshold-
based secret sharing protocol in a distributed online social
network (DOSN). Such a system uses a distributed or a P2P
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infrastructure for its users’ data management and storage,
while providing functionalities of conventional (centralized)
social networking sites such as Facebook.com or Orkut.com.
There are various motivations for such a decentralized
architecture, foremost among these being users’ privacy and
autonomy from not only fellow users but also from service
providers. The vision of DOSN platforms has been presented
in several recent works, e.g., [1], [2], [5], [8], or Tribler.org.
We next describe our application of threshold-based cryp-
tographical protocols through a concrete usage scenario.
This scenario comes up from our experience in the de-
velopment of such a DOSN, where users need a means
to back up and recover their private keys in a network of
untrusted servers1. We also use this example to elaborate on
the problem we study in this paper, as well as to define the
scope of our intended solutions for the problem. A practical
realization of this scenario and its related solutions is the
recovery of user’s passwords in a distributed storage system
such as Wuala.com.
Private key recovery example: Alice’s computer crashed,
so she must use another computer. She wants to log in to
her online social network (a DOSN) from the new computer,
retrieve associated data and resume her life online.
When Alice first created her account using the previous
computer, the system generated a private key as a means
of authentication associated with her username. The private
key of Alice is the ultimate secret enabling her to manage
her personal data, e.g., to edit a blog entry or to configure
her privacy setting. In opposite to conventional web-based
online social networks such as Facebook.com where user
data are stored at servers owned by the service providers,
a DOSN platform enables Alice to store her personal data
mainly on her computer to ensure her total control on these
data. However, anticipating a future crash of the original
computer and loss of the data stored locally on it, and also to
increase data availability, Alice’s data is also encrypted and
replicated in other machines. As the private key is difficult
to remember and can also be lost, it is also backed up: Alice
split the key according to a (2,3)-threshold cryptography
approach, and stored that in the network itself.
1We will use two terms secret and private key interchangeably henceforth
For enhanced security, each part of the key was encrypted
by a passphrase chosen by Alice, resulting in n = 3
encrypted shares. Each of the three delegates Bob, Carol,
and Dora is asked by Alice to keep a different encrypted
share. These delegates are expected to only send a share to
the user proven to be Alice.
Since the delegates may not know Alice a priori or
they may not be able to meet in person, they need to
verify Alice’s identity (and thus ownership of the secret).
Automatic verification, such as security questions/answers
are applicable. These questions/answers can be possibly
different for each delegate and digitally signed by Alice
to prevent forgery. Upon successful verification of Alice’s
identity, a delegate sends back to Alice the locally stored
encrypted share of Alice’s secret. Alice recovers her private
key by getting any two shares from three delegates, which
she can decrypt using her private passphrase.
Unfortunately, there are several practical problems in
using such a secret sharing scheme in a DOSN scenario.
• Users may be untrustworthy (malicious) when acting
as delegates. An untrustworthy user may keep the
shares to steal the secret for her own purposes, e.g.,
to control and steal Alice’s private data. A user is
untrustworthy either because she is curious (and nosy)
or because her computer is controlled by a malicious
software (an adversary). In the above example, the key
of Alice is lost if (and only if) any k ≥ 2 delegates
among Bob, Carol, and Dora, are untrustworthy.
• The original secret can not be recovered without
enough trustworthy delegates available, e.g., both Bob
and Carol are on vacation and turn off their computers.
Also, delegates may send invalid shares to reject the
owner’s requests, either intentionally or accidental due
to software bugs, network errors, etc.
• The secret owner may forget the passphrase or an-
swers to secret questions, and cannot recover the secret.
The passphrase or these answers may also be lost (weak
passwords) and thus an adversary can easily use this
information to steal the secret (identity theft).
The main focus of this paper is on the first issue, as
in online social networks the problem of collusion among
malicious delegates are even more feasible and detrimental.
An adversary can control a large number of malicious users
appearing as legitimate to coordinate the attack and steal
the user’s key, i.e., the Sybil attack. Having the private key,
the adversary may tweak security options on the victim’s
machine, enabling malicious applications to control and
use that machine for further attacks. The situation is even
worse as a user usually trusts her friends, unaware of
whether their machines are already under control of an
adversary. This viral infection may spread through social
links rapidly, leading to an epidemic that makes the whole
system eventually collapse.
Towards the above problem, most enhancements of
threshold-based secret sharing schemes include the possibil-
ity to verify the validity of a share, to change the threshold
dynamically, or to improve the computational and communi-
cating efficiencies of the approach [13]. Current solutions to
protect keys are to encrypt shares with passwords or to use
verifiable credentials. The resilience of such protocols under
collusive attacks of malicious nodes are not yet sufficiently
studied. There has been little study of how to select the most
reliable delegates under various adversary distributions in a
large distributed network and understand the impact of such
selection to the security level of the whole system. The main
reason for such limitations is that threshold cryptography is
mostly used on systems under control of a single centralized
provider, which is different from our application context.
To improve security of the secret sharing protocol in such
distributed scenarios, we propose in this paper a mechanism
to select the most trustworthy delegates. Delegate trustwor-
thiness is estimated by exploiting relationships among the
secret owner, delegate candidates, and their related friends.
This trust measure minimizes the likelihood of the secret
being stolen by an adversary and is shown to be effective
against various collusive attacks. Extensive simulation shows
that compared to other approaches, e.g., [17], our trust-
based selection performs very well in a variety of scenarios
with several nodes under control of the adversary, with
different distributions of adversarial nodes, and even with
the spreading of infection from malicious nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is among
the first ones applying threshold cryptographical protocols to
enable secure secret sharing on distributed social networks.
Our improved secret sharing scheme also has other practical
applications, such as to enable delegated access control
on other distributed systems. For instance, in a P2P-based
content sharing system, a peer may rely on trustworthy
delegates to distribute the data encryption key to those peers
whose identities are unknown beforehand2 yet proven to
be from a subscribed reader group. With the given key,
authorized readers can then decrypt any data replica by the
original author even if the author is unavailable.
To reduce our work scope, we do not focus much on the
second issue: the impacts of delegate availability to recon-
struct the backed-up secrets. In fact, delegate unavailability
is not a major problem in this key recovery scenario, as
such recovery is assumedly unfrequent. Thus, if there is
not enough delegates available at the moment to rebuild the
secret, the owner may simply wait.
The third issue is related to user’s security awareness,
which is orthogonal to our current problem. Nevertheless,
with a threshold cryptographical approach, even if a user
may choose weak passwords, an adversary must collect at
least k shares and successfully decrypt them to steal the key.
2Otherwise, a traditional PKI-based approach can be used, e.g., by
encrypting the key with the public key of the authorized reader.
Therefore, using threshold cryptography to backup key is a
generalized and more secured backup procedure compared
to conventional approaches, e.g., to backup the whole key
on a single server on the network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notations
Denote as U the set of users of an online social network.
Let Df be the set of possible types of relationships among
users, e.g., family, close friends, colleagues, or acquain-
tances. Define the mapping f : U×U → Df as relationships
among these users U . A distributed online social networking
platform is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1: A distributed online social network, or
DOSN for short, is a triple 〈U , f,RP〉, where U is the set
of users or computers and f denotes the social relationships
among them. The mapping RP : U → 2U is the data
replication strategy that defines the set of nodes in the system
to store data Ru of a user u ∈ U .
Def. 1 associates each user with a node, e.g., her main
working computer, in the underlying distributed storage
system. This assumption simplifies our problem and sub-
sequent analysis while still being realistic as most users
uses primarily a computer to work. Hence, we will use the
notation peer, node, or user interchangeably in this paper. We
are interested in building a mechanism to share a secret key
in a DOSN platform, with any replication strategy, securely
and effectively under various adversarial attacks.
B. Adversary model
We assume the adversary who wants to steal secrets of
users to has the following capabilities.
A1 The adversary can compromise many nodes (com-
puters of users). Compromised nodes know and collab-
orate well with each other to achieve their goal: to steal
as many secrets as possible.
A2 Delegates of a user are publicly known and thus also
known to the adversary.
A3 The adversary has computational power to perform
dictionary-attacks to decrypt the shares if she obtains
it and can reconstruct the secret successfully. Further-
more, the adversary is cost-insensitive and has as much
time as she wants to complete the attacks.
A4 A user losing her secret may be infected and under
control of the adversary. This leads to the spreading
of infection (more peers are become bad choice as
delegates) that may contaminate the whole network.
The assumption A2 is to enable easy reconstruction of
the secret without requiring each secret owner to remember
her list of delegates. On the negative side, it reduces the
attack cost of an adversary: it does not need to probe many
users to steal a specific key. A practical system can put
a few extra safe-guards such as not making the delegates
public knowledge, at the cost of increased system design
complexity. In summary, the above adversary is extremely
powerful and our security analysis will be done under such
pessimistic assumptions.
C. Security of the threshold-based secret sharing
The security and correctness of a (k, n)-threshold-based
secret sharing protocol depend on the number of trustwor-
thy and corrupted delegates in the delegate selection. A
trustworthy delegate sends correct shares only to authorized
requesters. Additionally, trustworthy delegates do not steal
the secret by colluding with others to steal the original secret.
A delegate who is not trustworthy is defined as corrupted
or malicious.
Given the above adversary model, it is possible for an
adversary to decrypt any encrypted share. Thus a (k, n)-
secret-sharing scheme is secured if and only if there are: (1)
at most k − 1 bad delegates; and (2) at least k trustworthy
delegates available in a user’s delegate selection to restore
the secret. Therefore, the remaining and most important
concern of a user is to choose her delegates to prevent
corrupted delegates from stealing her secret by colluding
with others. An approach to this problem is proposed and
analyzed in Section III.
Throughout the paper, we rely on a number of other
assumptions on our environments:
• A message from the owner to an off-line delegate can
be pending. When online again, the delegate pulls all
these off-line messages and processes them accordingly.
• We assume the compromise of a node by an adversary
does not jeopardize its availability, similar to [17].
This is realistic since if infected machines become
unavailable, e.g., cannot boot up or cannot connect to
the network, this can signal to the owner to scan and
clean her computer from malicious software.
III. SELECTION OF RELIABLE DELEGATES
Due to various privacy and security settings, it is generally
impossible for a user to crawl the whole network and gather
all important information to best select the delegates. For
example, personal data of a user and her relationships with
others in most cases are not publicly available. Therefore, a
user can only use her local knowledge and available public
information in the network in making the delegate selection.
We formally describe such a selection approach as follows.
Consider a DOSN 〈U , f,RP〉 as in Def. 1. Denote as
Fu = F
1
u the set of direct friends of a user u. The set of
k-degree friends of u, where k > 1 is recursively defined
as: Fku = {w | w ∈ Fv, v ∈ F
k−1
u }. The set of all indirect
friends of u is F∞u =
⋃∞
k=1 F
k
u .
Let P∞u be public personal information of users in F∞u ⊆
U and denote as f∞u the set of connections among them. A
(personalized) algorithm for a user u to select her delegates
is given in Def. 2.
Definition 2: A delegate selection algorithm of a user u is
defined as an algorithm operating on her personalized view
〈F∞u , f
∞
u ,P
∞
u 〉 on the social network and outputs a list of
delegates Du ∈ 2F
∞
u
.
Let D be a set of delegates selected by u for a (k, n)-
secret-sharing scheme3. Denote as Dc and Da be respec-
tively the number of corrupted and available delegates in
the set D. Also, define Dat the number of trustworthy and
available delegates in D. Our selection approach relies on
the following concept of ε-security, given in Def. 3.
Definition 3: (ε-security) The selection D is said to be
ε-secured if and only if the probability that at least k trust-
worthy delegates are available in D is Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ 1−ε,
where 0 < ε < 1.
We want to study the way u selects her set of delegates D
to ensure the availability and secured access to her backed-
up secret. For simplicity, fix the number k and the security
parameter 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. Let D = {i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We want to
select D based on k, ε such that the resulting (k, n)- secret
sharing scheme is ε-secured (Def. 3).
Denote T (n, k−1) = Pr(Dc ≤ k−1) and A(n, n−2k+
1) = Pr(Da ≥ 2k−1)= Pr (at most n−2k+1 are offline).
Assume that the probabilities that a user i is trustworthy and
available, are 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1, respectively. One
can verify that T (i, 0) =
∏i
j=1 tj and T (i, i) = 1. The
following recurrence relations can be obtained using basic
probability update rules:
T (i+1, l+1) = ti+1T (i, l+1)+(1−ti+1)T (i, l), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (1)
Similarly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A(i, i) = 1, A(i, 0) =
∏i
j=1 aj ,
and:
A(i+ 1, l + 1) = ai+1A(i, l + 1) + (1− ai+1)A(i, l) (2)
Given our adversary model in Section II-B, availability
and trustworthiness of nodes are assumed to be independent.
Therefore, the probability of at least k trustworthy delegates
available among n delegates is:
Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ Pr(Da ≥ 2k − 1,Dc ≤ k − 1)
= A(n, n− 2k + 1)T (n, k − 1) (3)
Proposition 1 gives us certain properties of the probabili-
ties T (n, k−1) = Pr(Dc ≤ k−1) and A(n, n−2k+1) =
Pr(Da ≥ 2k− 1). The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1: For any n ≥ k > 0:
(i) Irrespective of the selection D, T (n, k − 1) and
A(n, n − 2k + 1), where n > 2k − 1, are increasing
functions of k and decreasing functions of n.
(ii) T (n, k − 1) is maximized where D is n delegates
with highest trustworthiness ti among the candidates.
A. Measuring trustworthiness of delegate candidates
Let i be a possible delegate candidate for u. In practice, i
may be a friend of u, or a third-party provider offering data
storage services. The measurement of the trustworthiness ti
3the index u is omitted for presentation clarity
of a user i is non-trivial. In our scenario, the notion of trust
between two users is beyond the social trust between people,
since the computer of a highly reliable and trustworthy
friend may still be compromised by an adversary without
the friend’s awareness. Therefore, a user needs a more
appropriate measure to evaluate the trustworthiness of a user
before selecting her as a delegate. More precisely, ti is the
personal belief of u on whether i is likely to be controlled
by an adversary. Such a value ti depends on the following
influential factors:
• whether the node i is a well-known trusted entity. For
example, nodes from third-party providers offering data
storage services can be seen as less vulnerable as they
are usually equipped with up-to-date security patches
and latest virus definitions.
• whether i has potential to collude and steal a secret,
since curious friends may collude to get illegitimate
access to unauthorized data. Also, if a user’s friend is
compromised by an adversary, other friends of hers are
also vulnerable to attacks by the same adversary. In
practice, viruses are likely to spread from one friend to
another since people generally trust files or links sent by
their friends. To minimize the influence of such attacks,
we should give less trust to those delegates i with
more chances to collude with each other. Informally, we
should select delegates from different sets of friends to
reduce the possibility of a collusive attack and minimize
the influence of such a collusion.
• whether i is an attractive target for an adversary:
since an adversary can minimize her attack cost by
compromising nodes holding more keys, i is more
attractive to an adversary if she is a delegate of many
users. Hence, less trust should be put on those candi-
dates i currently keeping more shares.
Given the above observations, the following heuristics can
be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a user. The key
idea is to explore social relationships among users to prevent
the spreading of infection from malicious nodes already
under adversary control, as well as reducing the chance of
colluding among these malicious nodes. More concretely,
we define:
ti =
{
1 if i ∈ D0
1− δ(bi)− σ(li) if i ∈ [N ] = Fu \D0
(4)
where bi =| F∞i ∩Fu | and li is the number of shares held by
i. The candidate delegates [N ] = {i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are from
the set of friends of the user Fu. In Equation (4), D0 is a set
of m < k preferred/trusted delegates chosen by the secret
owner u. For instance, a good choice of D0 include nodes
from third-party providers offering data storage services.
Note that bi =| F∞i ∩ Fu | is the number of all indirect
friends of i who are also in Fu \D0. Thus 0 ≤ δ(bi) ≤ 1
quantifies two influential factors: (1) how i is able to collude
with her friends to compromise a shared secret; and (2) the
influence i and her friends may cause to the owner u if i is
compromised by an adversary. Thus u puts higher trust on
a friend i with less connection with others of her friends.
Given this observation, in our delegate selection algorithm,
we set k > maxi∈[N ]{bi} (Algorithm 1).
The term 0 ≤ σ(li) ≤ 1 determines the attractiveness of i
to an adversary, e.g., how many keys the adversary gets by
compromising i.
We let 0 ≤ δ(bi) ≤ 1 reach the maximal value of 1 at bi ≥
b∗ = k −m and be at the minimum 0 at bi = 0. Similarly,
σ(li) is defined to achieve the maximal value of 1− δ(bi) at
li = l
∗ = max{li, i ∈ [N ]} and be 0 at li = 0. That means
currently we care more on the impact of δ(bi) than of σ(li).
The testing of different impact weights by δ(bi) and σ(li) is
subject to future work. Depending on user’s prior belief on
the environment vulnerability, the following functions can
be used:
• exponential: e.g., δ(bi) = 1{bi>b∗}+1{bi≤b∗} 2
bi−1
2b∗−1
and
σ(li) = (1 − δ(bi))
2li−1
2l∗−1
. These functions4 are appro-
priate for vulnerable environments with potentially a lot
of malicious users. Hence, the possibility that a node
j would be compromised increases exponentially with
the number of shares she keeps li and the number of
common friends bi between i and u.
• logarithmic: e.g., δ(bi) = 1{bi>b∗} + 1{bi≤b∗}
log(bi+1)
log(m+1)
and σ(li) = (1 − δ(bi)) log(li+1)log(l∗+1) . These functions are
appropriate in more secured environments with fewer
malicious users, thus the possibility j being compro-
mised increases less than linearly with li and bi.
• linear: δ(bi) = 1{bi>b∗}+1{bi≤b∗} bib∗ and σ(li) = (1−
δ(bi))
li
l∗
, which are applicable in neutral environments
with a moderate number of malicious users.
B. A trust-based delegate selection algorithm
According to Proposition 1, the probability T (n, k −
1) = Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1) is maximized by choosing D
as n delegates with highest trustworthiness ti from the
candidates [N ]. We assume that messages to unavailable
delegates can be kept pending and processed later on when
they go online (Section II). Hence the unavailability of
delegates do not affect the computation of the probability
T (n, k − 1)A(n, n − 2k + 1), and we can approximate
T (n, k − 1)A(n, n− 2k + 1) = T (n, k − 1).
With the trust measure in Section III-A, the selection
of delegates to maximize the probability T (n, k − 1) is
given in Algorithm 1. Roughly speaking, we sequentially
pick a user i with the highest trust value ti from remaining
candidate delegates. Thus Algorithm 1 forms a delegate set
D approximately maximizing T (n, k− 1). Since Pr(Dat ≥
k) ≥ T (n, k−1), we expect this algorithm to maximize the
probability that the delegate set achieved the desired security
level ε.
4The function 1{A} evaluates to 1 if A is true and to 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 stops in two cases: first, all available N
candidates are selected to be delegates; second, we achieve
the desired security level 1− ε. In the first case, the actual
security level of the selection is Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ Pr(Dc ≤
k − 1) = T (n, k − 1). This lower bound T (n, k − 1) also
reflects the vulnerability of the environment and may be used
by the user to decide whether to share her secret. In our later
experiments, a user backs up her secrets only if the achieved
security level is Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1− ε is
a parameter of our experiments.
Algorithm 1 selectDelegates(candidates [N ], trustworthi-
ness ti for each i ∈ [N ], threshold k, security parameter ε):
selected delegates D, achieved security level T [n, k − 1]
1: n = 0; D = ∅; L = [N ]; /* L is the current candidate list */
2: T [n, 0] = T [n,1] = 1;
3: while (n ≤ N and T [n, k − 1] < 1− ε) do
4: Pick user i with highest ti in L;
5: n = n + 1; D = D ∪ {i}; L = L\{i};
6: T [n, 0] = tiT [n− 1, 0]; T [n, k] = 1;
7: for l = 1 to min(n− 1, k − 1) do
8: T [n, l] = tiT [n− 1, l] + (1− ti)T [n− 1, l − 1];
9: end for
10: end while
11: Return D and expected lower bound of security level T [n, k − 1];
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The DOSN is simulated as a discrete event-based sys-
tem with the agent-based simulation toolkit Repast [9]. A
social network in an experiment is a graph of of 1028
users. The network topology follows Watts-Strogatz small
world model [16], with connection radius 2 and rewiring
probability 0.8 (thus this network has short average path
length and a small clustering coefficient). This model was
due to its simplicity and small world properties of social
networks. Larger scale simulations are possible, yet we used
smaller networks to reduce the simulation time. Another
reason is that a DOSN is likely to be self-organized in
ad hoc manner, e.g., among people within a geographical
vicinity. Hence its size should be much less than traditionally
centralized social networks. Experiments with other types
of topologies are subject to future work (this is in fact a
limitation of our work). We implemented a message-passing
system where messages arriving at an unavailable recipient
are made pending and processed later when the recipient
goes back online. Such properties can be realized in practice
with distributed storage techniques: messages are encrypted
and stored in a DHT look up system [15] built on top of the
user’s computers. User unavailability hence, does not affect
their being selected as delegates: a user sending a request
for a share to an off-line delegate simply waits till the latter
is available.
A. Implementation of delegate selection approaches
We implemented different delegate-selection approaches,
each of which uses only local knowledge to select delegates,
as in Def. 2.
• FRIENDBASED: a user selects all her friends as
delegates. This approach was studied in a previous
related work [17] for a different application (document
signing) and in a limited case (without spreading of
infection from malicious users).
• RANDOMWALK: a user random walks on the (pub-
lic) social network graph and picks a delegate after
TTL = 7 steps. This approach selects those delegates
connected with many friends who also have high con-
nectivity, e.g., nodes with higher PageRank-like values.
• TRUSTBASED: the trust-based delegation selection
algorithm described in Algorithm 1, Section III. We
used a reasonably small security parameter ε = 0.001,
and with σ(.) and δ(.) as exponential functions, i.e,
users believe the environment is vulnerable. A user only
decides to share a secret if and only if the achieved
security level is Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤
1− ε is an experiment parameter.
B. Experiment design
We use two following system performance metrics: fL
and fb. 0 ≤ fL ≤ 1 is the fraction of secrets (private keys)
lost among those backed up by using the threshold-based
secret sharing scheme. A smaller fL implies a more secured
system and thus is preferable. 0 ≤ fb ≤ 1 is the fraction of
users (among all) who can back up their secrets successfully.
A higher fb means higher usability of the system and thus is
better. Note that fb is only meaningful to the TRUSTBASED
selection algorithm, since only this algorithm requires that
a secret is backed up only if the achieved security level
is Pr(Dat ≥ k) ≥ τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 − ε. Other
selection approaches (FRIENBASED or RANDOMWALK)
have fb = 1. We tested the TRUSTBASED approach with
different values of τ and found that in most cases fb > 0.9,
and τ does not clearly affect fL. Therefore, we focus on
the performance metric fL in later experiments with a given
value τ = 0.75.
Given the above metrics, the system load model consists
of the following factors:
• inf : whether there is an infection spreading in the
network, i.e., whether a user having lost her secret also
becomes under adversary control.
• pmal : the percentage of initially malicious users, i.e.,
the number of users already under adversary control at
the beginning of the simulation before the adversary
commands them to initiate the coordinated attack. A
higher pmal means a more vulnerable environment.
• adv : the distribution of the initially malicious users in
the network. The distribution can be random or based
on certain criteria, e.g., number of friends of a user.
Beside the load factors and their intensities, the major
factors influencing the system performance are:
• select : the algorithm to select delegates for the
secret sharing protocol, which includes the three
algorithms FRIENDBASED, RANDOMWALK, and
TRUSTBASED as described in Section IV-A.
• 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1: the threshold k/n of a (k,n)-threshold
secret-sharing scheme being used.
Our goal is to measure the effects of two factors select
and ξ to the system performance fL under various load
intensities inf , pmal , and adv .
We ran each simulation with appropriate parameters and
measured each performance metric when the simulation
reached the stationary regime. The result (not shown) con-
firms that the distribution of fL is approximately Gaussian
and perfectly iid. Therefore, for later experiments, we only
ran each simulation with N=35 replications (sufficiently
large sample size) and summarized the measurements of fL
with its means and confidence intervals at level 95%. As
data is roughly normal iid, this summarization shows both
accuracy and variability of our results.
C. Effects of the threshold values ξ
We first measured influences of the cryptographical
threshold ξ = k/n to system security under various load
intensities. For this goal ξ was varied from 0.1 to 1.0 for
each of the delegate selection approaches FRIENDBASED,
RANDOMWALK, and TRUSTBASED. The influence of ξ
on the fraction of secrets lost fL for each selection algorithm
is given in Figure 1, where the Y-axis shows the mean of
fL and 95%-confidence intervals of the mean of fL.
For each given delegation-selection algorithm, we varied
the load intensity as follows. First, pmal was increased
from 0.1% to 50% to simulate environments with different
numbers of malicious users under adversary control. To
reduce the simulation parameter space, we randomized the
distribution of these initially malicious users in the network
(adv=RANDOM). Each experiment was carried out with
both cases (inf = false and inf = true).
We expected fL to be lower with higher values of ξ. In
fact, the results in Figure 1 give us two main observations.
Firstly, for any delegate-selection algorithm and for any case
of infection spreading, the smallest fraction of keys lost fL is
achieved with ξ = 1. This is intuitive: given a secret sharing
scheme with ξ = 1, the adversary must successfully attack
all delegates of a user to be able to steal the victim’s secret.
For values of ξ < 1.0 the differences are not substantial.
Secondly, we observe that the system security with an
infection spreading (left pane of each figure) is much lower
than without infection spreading (right pane). Figures 1(a,
c, e), left panes, show that the adversary can steal a large
fraction of secrets (from 50% up to 100% of secrets in most
cases) by initially controlling a small number of malicious
users (from 0.2% if ξ < 1 and from 5% if ξ = 1).
The influence of the infection spreading is minimal in
two cases: (1) with ξ = 1.0 and the delegate-selection
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Figure 1: Influence of the crypto threshold ξ on the fraction of secrets lost fL with different delegate-selection algorithms. The two critical
values of ξ are ξ = 1.0 and ξ < 1.0
approach FRIENDBASED as in Figure 1(a, left), and (2):
for the TRUSTBASED delegation selection algorithm, as in
Figure 1(left side of e, f). These observations will be verified
in the next section.
D. Effects of delegate selection algorithms
As the next step, we measured effects of differ-
ent delegate-selection algorithms (FRIENDBASED, RAN-
DOMWALK, and TRUSTBASED) to the system security
under various load intensities.
Specifically, the first load factor pmal was varied from
0.1% to 50% to simulate different environments with small
(0.1% to 1%) and large (1% to 50%) numbers of malicious
users under adversary control. Initially malicious users were
randomly distributed in the network and each experiment
was carried out in both settings: with or without infection
spreading (inf = false or true).
From previous experiments (Section IV-C), we are only
interested in two critical values (ξ = 1 and ξ < 1) of
threshold ξ. The results are given in Figures 2.
We observe that the selection approach TRUSTBASED
is the best or comparable with the best in most cases, as
shown in Figure 2(a, b, d). In the only case with a very
small number of initially malicious users, and with ξ = 1
of Fig. 2(c), the selection algorithm FRIENDBASED is the
best. In practice, using the maximal threshold ξ = 1 may
not be preferable, as the secret owner may have to wait for
every delegate to be online to reconstruct her backed-up se-
cret. One possible reason why the TRUSTBASED selection
algorithm performs less well in this case is the difference
between the actual vulnerability of the environment and
the use of exponential functions σ(.) and δ(.) to evaluate
the trustworthiness measure of available delegate candidates.
Nevertheless, performance of the TRUSTBASED algorithm
is still reasonably good in this case: fL < 0.018 for
pmal ≈ 1% and inf = true as in Fig. 2(c). Remember that
fL is our system performance metric measured under a very
pessimistic estimation, where the adversary had unlimited
computational power to decrypt any protected share it ever
stole, the attained performance is acceptable.
The RANDOMWALK delegate selection approach,
though intuitively appealing, is not superior. Its performance
is somehow better where there is no infection spreading and
the adversary controls a very small number nodes, as shown
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Figure 2: Influence of delegate selection algorithms on fL, distribution of pmal=RANDOM, ξ = 0.5 (a,b) and ξ = 1 (c,d)
in Figure 2(c) and in the right pane of Figure 2(a).
Considering different adversary distributions: Another
interesting question is how well different delegate selection
algorithms perform under different adversary distributions.
Specifically, we want to know whether the adversary may
exploit her knowledge of the current delegate selection of
users to focus her attack in a number of well-chosen users
in the system.
Since the delegate selection algorithms FRIENDBASED,
RANDOMWALK, and TRUSTBASED all use connectivity
of users as a selection criteria for a delegate, an adversary
may attempt the following attacks:
• LINKBASED: initially, the adversary tries to control
nodes with higher numbers of links. These nodes are
likely to be chosen by many users as their delegates,
thus controlling these nodes help the adversary to steal
more secrets at a lower cost.
• KEYBASED: the adversary focuses on compromising
nodes currently keeping higher numbers of shares. This
attack is even more powerful, as apparently controlling
these nodes gives the adversary the highest likelihood
of stealing the maximal number of secrets.
We performed various experiments to measure the in-
fluence of the above adversarial attack strategies. Load
intensities are set up as in previous experiments, with varied
numbers of initially malicious users: pmal varied from
small (0.1% to 1%) to larger (1% to 50%). Both cases
of (inf = false or true) are considered, each with two
representative threshold values: ξ = 0.5 and ξ = 1.
Figure 3 shows the performance of different delegate-
selection approaches under the adversary attack using the
LINKBASED distribution. The result is similar to the pre-
vious case. The selection approach TRUSTBASED still
performs either best or comparable to the best approach in
almost all cases. Similar to the previous experiment with ran-
domly distributed adversary, the TRUSTBASED algorithm
performs less well than the FRIENDBASED approach where
there is a very small number of initially malicious users and
the threshold is ξ = 1. The algorithm RANDOMWALK
is not superior in majority of cases we studied. Experi-
ments for the adversary distribution KEYBASED are more
complicated, as they requires detailed time-variant modeling
of distributions of adversarial attacks and the selection of
delegates. This experiment is subject to our future work.
V. RELATED WORK
Applications and usability of threshold cryptography in
P2P and mobile ad hoc networks are discussed in detailed by
Saxena et al in [12]. This work mostly focuses on evaluating
computational and communication overhead of different
threshold cryptographical protocols. Security properties of
such protocols under collusive attacks of many malicious
nodes are not discussed.
There are several improvements of the original threshold-
based secret sharing scheme, e.g., produce verifiable shares,
change the threshold dynamically, improve the protocol’s
computational and communication efficiencies [13]. The
selection of reliable delegates to minimize the influence of
collusive attacks, however, is not the focus of the security
research community. Various security solutions mostly pro-
tect secret shares by encrypting these shares with passwords.
These works are complementary to ours, since we can use
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Figure 3: Influence of delegate-selection algorithms on fL, distribution of pmal=LINKBASED, ξ = 0.5 (a,b) and ξ = 1 (c,d)
any enhanced threshold cryptographical approach for our
delegated key recovery scenario.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first
one applying threshold cryptography to enable private key
backup and recovery in distributed social networks. Another
novelty of this work is the proposal of appropriate trust
measures based on social relationships among users. This
solution is shown to be effective against possible infection
spreading, and resilient under presence of various malicious
nodes with different distributions.
The most related work to ours is [7], [17], where the au-
thors apply threshold cryptographical approaches for another
other problem on social networks. [17] considers the ap-
plication of threshold cryptographical protocols for signing
documents, which is different from ours since it requires a
user to be available to issue the digital signature. Regarding
the technical approach, our work is also different from [7],
[17]. First, we study the effectiveness of many delegate
selection approaches given the presence of various numbers
of malicious users and with possible infection spreading.
The FRIENDBASED delegate selection algorithm that we
analyzed is the same as the approach of using trusted friends
to store the cryptographical keys proposed by [17]. Second,
the adversary model we are considering is more powerful
with its capability of spreading its infection to many nodes.
Our simulations also consider many possible attack models
of the adversary. [7] proposes to create certificates based on
agreement of a number t of nodes in the network determined
dynamically. The main result is a preliminary analysis on the
probability of nodes being attacked. The issues of infection
spreading and the selection of reliable delegates, however,
are not yet studied.
To a larger extent, our work is also related to credential-
based access control in P2P and social networks. Credentials
can be generated by specialized hardware such as the Trusted
Computing Platform [11], or based on certain attributes of
the requesters [10]. Most work in this direction address the
general problem of access control with the assumption that
access is granted to authorized users with identities known
beforehand. This assumption is not valid in our scenario of
backing up and recovery of secrets and thus these approaches
are not applicable. In other works, such as [3], [4], [6],
[10], heuristic measures are used to evaluate trust between
the resource owner and the requester before the credential
is granted. For example, [3] assigns each edge between
users a trust level and a relationship type and uses a central
node for registration and management. [6] proposes to grant
access to resources based on chain of trust relationships
between the resource owners and the requesters. An open
problem of these solution approaches is a detailed analysis
of their correctness and security under collusive attacks and
spreading of adversarial infection in the network.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The question of secure backup and recovery of secrets
in (distributed online social) systems is an important and
challenging issue. Our work provides a promising first step
toward an appropriate technical solution to this problem.
We have studied the application of threshold-based secret
sharing protocols for this purpose and suggested potential
mechanisms to improve the security of these protocols.
Specifically, we have proposed an algorithm to select most
reliable delegates to enable such a secure secret sharing
in a network of untrusted nodes. This approach selects
delegates based on a simple trust measure that exploits social
relationships among the secret owner, delegate candidates,
and their friends, to minimize the probability that a set
of delegates collude together to steal the secret. Such an
approach has been shown to perform very well under variety
of scenarios, even with a large number of initially malicious
users with possible spreading of infection in the network.
A limitation of this work is that we only consider small-
world network topology with homogeneous degree distri-
bution. It would be important to also measure and analyze
performance of various selection algorithms in larger scale
heterogeneous networks, e.g., with heavy-tailed node degree
distributions. The dynamics of networks with a growing
number of users is also an important factor yet to be studied.
As part of our future work, we plan to study realistic cost
models of an adversary to integrate to the design of potential
delegate selection mechanisms. This issue is important since
the attack by a rational adversary may be well-related to its
endured cost. The self-healing capability of the distributed
social network via the detection and cleaning of malicious
and infected nodes is also an interesting issue we plan to
study as part of future work.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
(i) We prove the monotonicity of T (n, k − 1) first. The
proof for A(n, n − 2k + 1) can be done similarly. From
its definition, it follows that T (n, k) ≥ T (n, k − 1). The
proof of T (n + 1, k) ≤ T (n, k) is also trivial. In fact,
T (n+ 1, k)−T (n, k) = tn+1T (n, k)+ (1− tn+1)T (n, k−
1)−T (n, k) = (1− tn+1)(T (n, k−1)−T (n, k)) ≤ 0, since
T (n, k − 1) ≤ T (n, k) from the above result.
(ii) Suppose that the delegate set D has n delegates, where
each i ∈ D has ti ≥ tj , j ∈ [N ] \ D.
Consider another delegate set D′ different from D by one
delegate. Define D′ = succ(D) = (D \ {i}) ∪ {j}, where
j ∈ [N ] \ D and ti ≥ tj , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We will show
Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1) ≥ Pr(D
′
c
≤ k − 1).
As delegates have equal roles, the order of putting a user
i in a delegate set D does not influence the probability
Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1). Let us select the user i at the last step to
form the set D and select j at the last step to form D′.
It follows that Pr(Dc ≤ k−1) = tiT (n−1, k−1)+(1−
ti)T (n−1, k−2) and Pr(D′c ≤ k−1) = tjT (n−1, k−1)+
(1−tj)T (n−1, k−1). Since T (n−1, k−1) ≥ T (n−1, k−2)
according to (i), and ti ≥ tj from the definition of D′, we
have:
Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1)− Pr(D
′
c ≤ k − 1) = (ti − tj)(T (n− 1, k − 1)
−T (n− 1, k − 2))
≥ 0
More generally, given any selection D′′ different from D
by J ≤ n users, one can verify that there exist a series of del-
egate selection Dj , 1 ≤ j ≤ J such that D′′ = DJ ,Dj+1 =
succ(Dj), 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, and D1 = succ(D). Since
D′ = succ(D) implies Pr(D′
c
≤ k−1) < Pr(Dc ≤ k−1),
it follows that Pr(D′′
c
≤ k − 1) < Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1).
Therefore, Pr(Dc ≤ k − 1) = T (n, k − 1) is maximized
with the delegate set D.
